Asia in the Middle East: The Internationalization of Singapore Private Firms into the GCC by YEOH, Caroline et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
10-2012 
Asia in the Middle East: The Internationalization of Singapore 
Private Firms into the GCC 
Caroline YEOH 
Singapore Management University, carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg 
Wilfred Pow Ngee HOW 
Singapore Management University, wilfred.how.2003@business.smu.edu.sg 
Simin Sharmaine NEO 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the International Business Commons 
Citation 
YEOH, Caroline; HOW, Wilfred Pow Ngee; and NEO, Simin Sharmaine. Asia in the Middle East: The 
Internationalization of Singapore Private Firms into the GCC. (2012). International Journal of Academic 
Research in Business and Social Sciences. 2, (10), 542-553. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School 
Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3244 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
  
 
 
 
ASIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SINGAPORE PRIVATE FIRMS INTO THE GCC 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilfred HOW Pow Ngee 
Singapore Management University 
 
Caroline YEOH 
Singapore Management University 
 
Sharmaine NEO Si Min 
Singapore Management Universty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: 
 
Caroline Yeoh 
Tel: +65 68280377 
Fax: +65 68280777 
carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Internationalization efforts into the GCC as a national initiative tend to be spearheaded by a vanguard of 
government-linked companies (GLCs), usually assisted in their entry through various connections, 
political or otherwise. As large companies with the presumed reliability of government backing, these 
GLCs tend to be involved in larger-scale, more critical, and more iconic projects. It is a matter of fact, 
however, that while internationalization may be led by large-scale and attention-grabbing GLCs, the vast 
majority of FDI and economic activity is, in the long term, entrenched in the activities of private 
companies. As such, it must logically follow that the study of these companies and their experiences in the 
Middle East must be of paramount relevance to assessing the state of internationalization into the region. 
In this paper, therefore, we focus the ambit of our continuing research into the internationalization efforts 
of Singapore into the Middle East onto several case studies of Singapore private firms in the GCC, and 
seek to derive observations pertinent both to the idiosyncrasies of Singapore business in the context of the 
Middle East, and conclusions pertinent to private firms across the globe with an interest in the region's 
rich yet cryptic business environments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a statement of simple fact that the Middle East, in recent years, has been a region at the centre of a 
constant whirl of economic headlines, both positive and negative. Equally undeniable is the fact that, 
despite the varying flavours of these economic headlines, the countries of the Middle East region, and of 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in particular, continue to be, and will remain, for the foreseeable 
future, trading partners and economic destinations of premier importance. Nor does this premier 
importance rest merely upon the region's critical role in energy provision for the world, but also upon the 
relatively new and ravenous appetite of the region for trade and investment, and the continuous (and, in 
some parts, arguably overboard) pouring of revenue into large-scale infrastructural development and 
diversification strategies into a variety of industries. And both of these relatively recent directions of 
development in the GCC have, arguably, further aligned the region's interest with that of their growing 
number of Asian business partners, equally hungry to feed a fast pace of economic development and ever-
growing global economic relevance. 
 
The GCC's development initiatives, in fact, while still relatively recent, are not a new development per se; 
trade figures from the GCC have been moving away from the long-standing oil-centric economic ties to 
OECD countries since the late 1990s, towards emerging markets across the world and most particularly in 
Asia, a function of the growing demand in these markets for not just oil, but also for capital 
(domestically) and economic space and opportunity (internationally). In recent years, especially, owing 
heavily to meteoric growth in China, Asia has overtaken most of the GCC's trading partners in volume 
and prominence; in context, Asia's share of trade with the GCC expanded from just 10% in 1980 to 36% 
by 2009, with growth in trade with Asia at an effective rate of 12% per year since 1980, double the rate of 
growth with the OECD. (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011) Should this pattern continue, Asia is 
projected to become the GCC's biggest trading partner by 2017, largely accounted for by India, China, 
and Indonesia, but with significant contributions by other prominent Asian economies – among them 
Singapore, a country with a history of purposeful and persistent international expansion strategies. 
 
The city-state of Singapore occupies, in many ways, a unique position in Asia; a highly developed nation 
with a strong economy, despite its infinitesimally small size and dearth of natural resources. It would 
perhaps not at all be an exaggeration to say that the continued growth of Singapore's economy has largely 
been due to the city state’s recognition at the onset that it needed to plug itself into the global economy, 
and to subsequent and continuing efforts to meet this need. Possessing limited economic space and 
subject to the inevitable rising cost structures of doing business at home, means were sought to 
encapsulate economic space overseas into which local enterprises could find room to grow their 
operations. Regionalization, and later, internationalization, became the city-state's key to unlock new and 
larger markets, and the policy document, Singapore Unlimited (Singapore Development Board, 1995) 
encapsulated this paradigm shift. 
 
Initial attempts to redistribute resource-dependent operations – particularly those of private local 
enterprises (PLEs) – to economic spaces orchestrated by the state in other countries reflected the city-
state's government’s intent to extend the Singapore state enterprise network, or Singapore Inc., to the 
region (Yeoh & Wong, 2005; How & Yeoh, 2007); a hallmark of these initiatives laid in the major 
involvement of the Singapore government itself, from provision of management to negotiation of 
incentives aimed at, for the most part, enticing the abovementioned PLEs to expand into these economic 
havens. As regionalization initiatives gave way to the current broader internationalization drives, 
however, the marked difference in the cultural, legal, and financial profiles of the city-state's new areas of 
exploration, along with the city-state's own previous experiences with regionalization initiatives, made it 
clear that a similar strategy of heavy government intervention would be suboptimal, at best. Going 
forward, a more firm-oriented approach would have to be taken with regards to internationalization; one 
relying very much more on the capabilities of Singapore firms themselves. 
 
Nowhere, of course, exemplifies a cornucopia of both the abovementioned critical differences in cultural, 
legal, and financial profiles conflated with a fertile bed of economic opportunity more than the GCC. 
Singapore's approach to internationalization into the GCC combines the expected and traditional 
trailblazing by government-linked companies (GLCs) with various forms of indirect support for private 
enterprises through governmental organizations and otherwise, and with efforts towards promoting 
greater awareness and understanding of, and perhaps more importantly, interest in the Middle East 
domestically – a concerted and intentional effort, it can be inferred, towards creating indirect incentives 
for PLEs to enter the GCC, to encourage a self-sustaining and critical mass of Singapore private 
enterprise in this new frontier. 
 
The efficacy of this tactic, however, remains to be seen. That Singapore GLCs have established a strong 
internationalizing presence in the GCC – most especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – is without a 
doubt; such GLCs have been involved in a good number of flagship infrastructural and property 
developments, the eventual fate of some of the latter notwithstanding, and arguably have indeed played 
the role of vanguard and trailblazer in a most exemplary fashion. Indeed, in a ranking of the top 100 
Singapore international companies, the top 12 are dominated by GLCs (IE Singapore, 2007), many of 
which are or have been involved in the GCC. That this is the case is, however, possibly in and of itself a 
matter of concern; suggesting, as it does, evidence towards a confirmation of the perception of a high 
degree of risk aversion among Singapore PLEs – an especial concern towards internationalization into the 
GCC, which, to said Singapore PLEs, represents an unfamiliar region with substantial uncertainties, albeit 
one with high potential return. (Yeoh & How, 2011) In the context of Singapore's internationalization 
efforts, then, the performance of PLEs currently with operations in the GCC must be of great relevance, 
both towards the long-term sustainability of internationalization efforts in the region, and, to the city-state 
particularly, towards the efficacy of current methods of creating economic space on foreign soil for 
(ironically, perhaps) Singapore private firms. 
 
This paper, thus, continues our research series on Singapore’s gambits in the Gulf region, this time with 
the spotlight on the state of Singapore PLEs that have extended operations into the GCC countries. In the 
following section, we examine the performance of these PLEs; first presenting theoretical frameworks 
relevant to the prevalent entry methods taken by said PLEs. We then present three case studies of PLEs 
which have ventured into the GCC region using these methods, using information gleaned, as always, 
primarily from face-to-face interviews with senior management personnel involved in the Middle East 
from the companies in question. From there, we discuss and evaluate the performance of Singapore PLEs 
in the GCC; drawing conclusions that, we intend, will be of relevance to private enterprises looking to the 
GCC, and of particular relevance to Singapore’s internationalization stratagem and the city-state’s intent 
to reconfigure the economy for the international marketplace. 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Franchising presents an attractive mode of entry PLEs, as it provides, potentially, a lower-risk mode of 
entry into new markets that are of greater uncertainty and risk. Most franchise businesses are designed for 
replication; the franchisor tends to look for suitable franchisees with a similar modus operandi in order to 
ease adaptation of the value chain to the new market. The main challenge of franchising is balancing the 
additional flexibility of operations with the consistency of the company’s brand. For a franchise to be 
recognizable, certain aspects of branding and identity have to remain consistent across all franchises. This 
balancing act of the inevitably necessary adaptation of value chains and operations to suit local conditions 
with consistent branding so as to prevent the dilution of the company’s image and reputation is often the 
deciding factor in how much control the parent company exerts over franchisees – and one that 
sometimes, needless to say, results in bad decisions. 
Under master franchising, in particular, the franchisee gains expanded methods of generating income  
over that of a normal franchisee, while the franchisor further defrays direct risk. A master-franchising 
agreement involves two main parties, the franchisor and the franchisee. In this model, the franchisor will 
deal with just one franchisee which will be responsible for a pre-specified area (Bashel, 2001). A master 
franchisee can be responsible for tasks such as support and training to maintenance, and receiving fees to 
paying out royalties. The master franchise relationship is more easily managed and enforced in 
environments with less-developed regulatory frameworks. The flexibility of a master franchisee stems 
from the concept of a global franchisor permitting affiliations with other franchisors (Pizanti & Lerner, 
2003). 
Management contracts as a method of entry, on the other hand, has gained recognition in recent years for 
being a strategy that holds little asset risk, yet promises the possibility of high yields from the outset. 
While there are no standardized management contracts, it typically involves the owner assuming full 
ownership of the capital intensive assets required for the business, and a company with the in-depth 
knowledge and experience has to bear the responsibility of managing the daily operations for the business 
(Guilding, 2003). This situation is particularly common in economies which face managerial scarcity 
(Brooke, 1985). 
Management contracts are attractive because owners stand to benefit from a reasonable amount of cash 
flow without having to operate the business and invest in the necessary human resources (Horwath and 
Horwath, 1988). Operators meanwhile, receive monetary incentives from managing the business, and it 
gains the exposure to market its brand internationally without investing heavily in the capital assets 
required (Welch and Pacifico, 1990). This strategy theoretically results in both parties being better off but 
drawbacks manifest itself in the agency problem that management contracts create. A divorce in the goals 
of the business for the operator and owner can lead to volatile situations that undermine the fundamental 
assurance and trust required for this strategy to work (Beals and Denton, 2005). 
Regarded as a knowledge-intensive business, consultancy adds value to companies because the consultant 
effectively brings to the table in-depth knowledge about a particular topic at hand and helps address the 
issues that the company faces by driving knowledge transfer. This value creation allows consulting 
companies to charge a premium on their services. Immense expansion into international markets through 
large office-networks has also been observed in this sector (Jones, 2003). Consulting firms are able to 
enter emerging markets, especially, with a value proposition that local firms are not able to match up to as 
the latter falls behind in terms of knowledge and human capital (Svensson, 2007). Local government 
development agencies in emerging markets have also begun to ride on the value of international 
consulting firms through a strategy of active engagement and encouraging direct interaction with local 
firms, which produces opportunities for knowledge transfer (Siggel, 1986). 
From the consultancy firm's perspective, of course, cases exist where knowledge transfer becomes too 
costly; these costs being the cost of securing the license for the project, adapting to the local environment 
and the training costs for the locals (Teece, 1981). Companies also have a vested interest in limiting 
knowledge transfer not eroding their proprietary knowledge base in the course of doing business with the 
client, because recipients of their services may easily replicate the knowledge given to them in future 
projects (Svensson, 2007); however, it must be noted that, as is the case with many of the GCC countries, 
this knowledge transfer is arguably of more interest to the host country than the projects themselves. 
 
CASE STUDIES 
Company A: Hospitality Developer  
 
A developer and provider of luxury serviced residences, Company A is a well-known large-scale 
international operator, with operations spanning more than 16,000 serviced residence units in cities in 
over 20 countries, including key cities of Europe, Asia Pacific, and the Gulf region. Initially entering the 
GCC, like so many others, through Dubai in 2006, the company wasted no time in attempting to expand 
to other countries in the region, among them Saudi Arabia and Qatar – an attempt, most likely, to garner 
early-mover advantages, and one which arguably succeeded in sidestepping a number of issues, such as 
occupancy inertia, that later entrants experienced.  
 
Instead, as could perhaps be expected, a number of other issues arose. A reasonably frequent user of 
management contracts as a tool to reduce risk, Company A went one further in the GCC – to date, every 
single project they have undertaken in the region has been under a management contract, rather than any 
equity-based interest, perhaps suggesting a highly cautious approach towards internationalization into this 
region; indeed, interviews suggest that the company feels it is not yet sufficiently familiar with the region 
to invest in equity stakes. In the course of  Company A's relatively aggressive expansion, then, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that a host of agency problems were encountered – projects in Dubai fell through 
due to conflicting interests with the initial local partner, whereas expansion plans elsewhere were hobbled 
by other local partners refusing to expand to countries outside their own tribal or political spheres of 
influence, or insisting on exclusivity in their contract with Company A within a certain country or city. 
Both issues were, arguably, further exacerbated by well-known later local financial and socio-political 
shocks; although this was partially due, arguably, to the company's own positioning and target clientele in 
the GCC. 
 
Company A's focus in the GCC was to be on providing premium quality accommodation for international 
expatriates, as opposed to local consumers – a tactic in line with the fact that, in many of the company's 
initial target areas, expatriates did indeed form the majority of the viable customer base, outnumbering the 
local Arabs. As such, Company A saved any need for customization to the local environment, and was 
able to offer its expatriate consumers an experience that was consistent with the company's well-
established international brand name. This did, however, mean that in the aftermath of the debt crisis, as 
the amount of business expatriates to some parts of the region fell, so too did occupancy rates in 
Company A's residences in those same regions, albeit not as badly as hotel occupancy rates. Events 
relating to the Arab Spring, too, had the effect of scuppering this potential customer base, on top of the 
usual concerns as to political stability – in one case, Company A has effectively retreated entirely from 
one such region for precisely these reasons. 
 
From another point of view, however, Company A's strategy of a pure management contract-based entry 
to the GCC then seems almost prescient – in point of fact, even completely defunct projects like those 
mentioned above each created relatively minimal loss for the company. Certainly the company itself is 
undeterred; it continues to aggressively secure new management contracts in the GCC, most recently for a 
property in Oman scheduled to open in 2014, a move further consistent with the company's strategy of, 
effectively, stealing a march on potential competitors. Even considering this relative lack of monetary 
risk, however, a rather pertinent question mark yet hovers over the long-term viability of a business 
strategy which appears, from above anecdotal evidence, to be quite susceptible to disruptions emanating 
from a local socio-political context – especially in the light of continuing events in the region. It is worth 
noting, however, that Company A itself may appear to be aware of this same problem – plans are 
apparently underway to allow some amount of customization among individual properties, most notably 
in pricing, and the company's choice of Oman, one of the more cosmopolitan areas in the region, as its 
latest destination may be a conscious choice with which to avoid said socio-political complications. 
Should this be indeed the case, it is a cautiously positive sign for Company A's growth going forward in 
the GCC. 
 
 
Company B: Property Developer (Architectural) 
 
Focusing on urban planning and project management, Company B is one of Singapore's premier 
architectural and design firms, a well-known name in the typically GLC-saturated Singapore property 
development market. Internationally, the company has interests focused largely in Asia, specifically in 
Southeast Asia, China, and India, but also spanning parts of Africa and, of course, the Middle East. 
Having entered the GCC (specifically, Dubai, like so many others) in 2005, Company B was a reasonably 
recent player in the GCC market, and faced stiff competition from rather larger international architectural 
firms already with a presence in Dubai. The company's entry into Dubai with a contract for an immense 
and iconic commercial development was, in the first place, only made possible through the cultivation of 
relations with a major local property developer – breaking into a market with such entrenched competitors 
would have otherwise been, presumably, quite the Sisyphean task. 
 
As an architectural and design firm, Company B's operations in the GCC are most adequately described 
as consultancy services specializing in providing design expertise and, in what the company terms a 
'value-added' proposition, management proficiencies relating to property developments the company has 
designed, if required. Worth noting is the apparent alignment of interests with the local context; the 
management consultancy services provide, arguably, a valuable source of knowledge transfer to local 
companies and personnel, whereas Company B itself is less than bothered by this knowledge transfer, its 
main value proposition lying in its designs and architectural expertise. This, theoretically, translates into 
two consequences, one positive, the other arguably  less so; the former, greater opportunity to cultivate 
the company's reputation in the region, an important element in a design-based industry; and the latter, a 
somewhat longer-term commitment to individual projects, on average, than most architectural firms. The 
company was, apparently, aware of these issues; it phases in the availability of these planning and 
management services only incrementally, so as to ensure lower initial commitment and a lighter 
investment requirement, showing, perhaps, endemic Singaporean caution, albeit caution not out of place 
for a relatively smaller company.  
 
In many ways, the initial experiences of the company in the GCC – Dubai in particular – was a study in 
culture shock. Company B has a highly centralized decision structure, with all architectural design 
performed in Singapore, reducing the need for local offices, which are generally more responsible for 
project management. In Dubai, however, like in much of the rest of the GCC, potential clients proved to 
prefer the ability to visit an office of and communicate regularly in person with the company, requiring a 
level of physical presence and responsiveness that Company B's structure did not encourage; especially 
with the high costs of maintaining an office in Dubai at the time, which a relatively smaller company like 
Company B was ill-prepared to sink into a yet uncertain market. In working with local contractors, too, 
Company B found itself faced with international standards more onerous than the company's experience 
with contractors in Singapore and the Southeast Asian region, requiring an exactitude in design drawings 
and labeling resulting in added expense of time and effort on the part of the company. And finally, the 
company faced the familiar problem of finding Singaporean staff willing to work in the region, and staff 
that did make the move experiencing culture shock of their own. In each such case, the company has 
adapted or made adjustments; the company's continued presence in the GCC attests, at least, to the 
efficacy of said adjustments. 
 
The debt crisis proved to pose far more of a threat, in fact, to said continued presence. While having 
begun to undertake projects in other parts of the GCC, a major part of Company B's presence at the time 
remained in Dubai, and was, obviously, affected quite adversely by the crisis. Consultancy services, after 
all, require a continuous flow of clients; and in the aftermath of the crisis, property development ground 
to a halt in Dubai, and slowed in a number of the surrounding regions. Staff in the Dubai office were left 
idle, and the company had to go to some lengths to retain them, while at the same time experiencing cash 
flow issues resulting from the stalling and/or renegotiation of several projects and extreme delays in 
payment for others – a heavy enough setback, indeed, that some companies may have begun considering 
an exit strategy. Perhaps Company B, too, did so – but in any case, the company chose the path of 
perseverance in the region, albeit with a focus now on other parts of the GCC, most notably Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar. The company has, in fact, secured several large-scale projects in Doha, the most recent being a 
prime commercial district slated for completion in 2015 – a new area of focus, perhaps, chosen with the 
raised profile of the 2022 World Cup in mind. Company B, it seems, has learned from its experiences and 
moved on; how much exactly it has learned, however, remains to be fully seen. One of its later projects, 
after all, was in Syria. 
 
 
Company C: Retail (Footwear and Accessories) 
 
Company C is a company in the business of retailing lines of ladies' footwear, men's footwear and 
accessories, most of which it owns and produces, and operates, at the current time, well over 160 outlets 
across more than 14 countries across the world; a rather significant portion of which – some 40-50 – are 
located in the GCC, underlining the significance of the GCC market to Company C. The term 'operate', in 
this case, is also used loosely; while the company undertakes direct retailing in its home country of 
Singapore, its outlets in most other countries are operated by local retailers under franchise agreements. 
Such is the case with all of Company C's outlets in the GCC, from its initial (and initially largest) foray in 
Dubai, to Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and its current largest concentration of outlets in Saudi 
Arabia. Taking these facts together, then, it becomes apparent that the choice of franchisees in the GCC is, 
similarly, highly significant to Company C as well. 
 
As it turns out, Company C's franchisees in the GCC are, in general, quite influential factors indeed on the 
company's fortunes in the GCC. Largely consisting of major local retailers managing multiple brands, 
including several of Company C's most pertinent competitors, these local franchisees hold a great degree 
of clout in the local market, capable of operating on a large scale and commanding premium retail space. 
As such, these local franchisees tend to hold a rather substantial degree of bargaining power, and are 
highly concerned with garnering profit – to the extent of, in Saudi Arabia, dropping brands judged to be 
unprofitable for themselves with no hesitation. It appears to have been, at least partially, with this in mind 
that Company C's ventures into the major markets of the GCC have been through the vehicle of master 
franchising – and furthermore, with agreements with these master franchisees including no franchising 
fees or royalties whatsoever (at least for initial periods), with profit coming from sales of the company's 
product lines to the franchisees; instead holding the condition that in each case, a certain number of 
outlets be opened within a particular time frame, taking the strategy, apparently, of aggressive and daring 
expansion into the market with the purpose of establishing the company's brand and physical presence in 
the GCC – performed in such a way as to feed the profit-aligned interests of the local partners quite well 
indeed. It is entirely likely that this alignment of interests forms a cornerstone of good relations between 
Company C and its franchisees, which play their vital role of implementing adjustments and adaptation 
strategies fairly well indeed, especially in Saudi Arabia, where, owing to local cultural influences, sales of 
womens' footwear became rather more complicated affairs, with house visits to close sales being more 
frequent while more bags, rather than footwear, were being sold in the retail outlets. 
 
Which is not to say, of course, that Company C experienced no issues at all with local franchisees. The 
company relates an anecdote of haphazard storefronts that the franchisee initially dismissed as being 
irrelevant to sales, an opinion with the company had to do some convincing to change. Nonetheless, it is 
perhaps partially due to this good working relationship that Company C was relatively unaffected by the 
the region's financial and socio-political storms; retail industries already being somewhat naturally more 
resilient to such shocks, the debt crisis put a temporary halt to expansion of outlets in the UAE, but 
changed little as far as expansion into other countries, and the company reports that even at the height of 
the crisis, stores in Dubai consistently generated some of the highest revenues in the region, despite being 
in the business of, technically, luxury goods. Sometimes, it seems, fortune favours the bold. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The need for adaptation and adjustment to new frontiers is a well-tread track of discussion in discourse on 
internationalization, one that we, too, have touched on to varying degrees in previous papers. That such 
adaptation and adjustment might be rather more pertinent for a private enterprise than a GLC is also fairly 
self-evident – lacking political patronage and national credibility to take as shelter from socio-political 
influences, a private enterprise has to, at least to some degree, forge their own reputation, build their own 
bridges. 
 
In the context of the above case studies, then, such adaptation and adjustment takes two distinct forms; 
modification of operational practices and strategies to better suit local markets and conditions, and 
alignment of interests with local partners. It is certainly possible to avoid both of these to some extent, 
and thereby incur less adjustment costs and commitment risk; as can be easily observed from the above, 
this is, in fact, precisely what Company A did to an extent, with its choice of target clientele, product 
strategy, and contract terms. The side effect of this, however, appears to be a greater vulnerability to 
market shocks, especially those emanating from the socio-political dimension – a local market is, at the 
end of it, a more stable and captive market than one dependent highly on international financial and 
corporate interests in said market.  
 
Such adaptation also becomes markedly more important for smaller private companies, which have 
neither the advantage of size and capital nor of the political patronage GLCs enjoy. That the specific 
market strategies employed by both Companies B and C include attempts to align their interests with 
those of local partners points, arguably, to an implicit understanding of this fact; and both companies have 
certainly had to make operational adjustments in line with local cultural and business standards. A 
question, however, arises as to far this process of adaptation actually ameliorates business risk and 
promotes the performance of a company in the GCC – and it is here that we arrive at decidedly mixed 
results, which appear to be mostly owing to distinct industry differences. Company B, engaged in a 
growth-reliant industry, performed quite well indeed in the GCC, but found itself just as vulnerable to 
shocks engendered by the debt crisis and subsequent socio-political instabilities in the region, albeit with 
a better recovery time than some of its peers experienced; whereas the retail industry Company C, with its 
emphasis more on stable operations, experienced only minor inconveniences, arguably due to the strong 
correlation of interests between the company and its franchisees. The adaptation process alone, it seems, 
is no foolproof shield against the vagaries of uncertainty; but can yet be, depending on the fundamentals 
of one's business, a very valuable tool indeed.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While, in recent years, the subsequent shocks of the debt crisis and of the Arab Spring have cooled 
international fervour for the Middle East somewhat, it remains a fact that the region in general, and the 
GCC in particular, yet presents a highly relevant horizon for internationalization and expansion. To many, 
though, it is now clear that companies seeking new horizons in the Middle East should and must now take 
into account the further potential of similar shocks in the future, and put into place contingencies for and 
strategies to ameliorate such eventualities; most especially for private companies, who are most 
vulnerable to such instabilities, and most definitely for companies in industries heavily reliant on the 
continued growth of the host market.  
 
So it has been with many of Singapore's private companies, which by and large have realized this after the 
fact. While many continue to retain an expanding presence in the GCC, a distinct pattern emerges upon a 
simple study of this continued expansion – one in which the casual observer easily notes a drift away 
from areas such as Dubai and Bahrain, towards ostensibly more stable growth markets, most notably 
Oman and Qatar, as well as a continued movement into Saudi Arabia, the largest market in the region. 
Despite, in many cases, a demonstrated vulnerability to financial and socio-political shocks, this choice of 
future directions appears to imply, instead, yet another expression of the Singapore tendency towards 
caution and conservative movement, having, to arguably, more in common with avoidance than 
adaptation. This may perhaps cast some doubt upon the viability of any internal measures being taken to 
reduce said vulnerability, which would seem to be a rather paramount concern for real long-term and 
sustainable internationalization into the region. Such measures being, of course, internal, only time and 
the test itself will tell – a test which, we likely all hope, will not be administered once more to the region 
any time soon. The state of Singapore's private enterprises in the GCC appears to be, at least at the current 
time, a healthy one – albeit one that should, perhaps, append a bracketed question mark to the end of that 
assessment. 
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